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Stealey: Banks and Banking--Branch Banks as Separate Entities
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
is not a reversal, the court is met with the statement that it is better
to let ninety-nine guilty men go free than to punish one innocent
man.8 Therefore the court is not free to correct this sort of misconduct.
While it is true that counsel should have great latitude in
the argument of a case, due to their commendable enthusiasm,
(which was probably the cause of the improper remarks in the
principal case) and that it probably should not be reversible
error even, for the prosecutor to say that he believed the accused
was guilty, we believe that there should be censure of the attorney,
and reversal, where there is prejudice, in every case where the
attorney deliberately makes statements which could not be properly brought in as evidence. But, as we have indicated above, the
court is not free always to reverse in such cases. As a cure for
this particular sort of misconduct a stronger condemnation by the
bar generally is suggested. That the bar, as well as the court,
may be responsible for the status of justice, see Reversals in Illinois
Criminal Cases' and Wigmore's article, Unprogressive Bar, Unprogressive Legislature, 'Unprogressive Justice."'
-HENRY

K. HIGGINBOTHAM.

BANKS AND BANKING-BRANCH BANKS AS SEPARATE ENTITIES.

-The plaintiff in the case of Dean: v. Eastern Sh7ore Trust Company' was a banking corporation operating several branches. The
defendant drew a check on branch A which the payee promptly
cashed at branch B. But before the instrument could reach branch
A to be debited against the defendant he had countermanded payment. The plaintiff was allowed to bring suit on the check itself,
the cashing branch being regarded as a separate entity for that
purpose.
For most purposes the relation between parent bank and
branch is that of principal and agent.! They are not usually regarded as separate entities. But it seems that for certain purposes
they may be quite distinct. On similar facts the bank has been
allowed to maintain an action for money had and received.' And
° See dissent in State v. Shawn, 40 W. Va. 1, 20 S. E. 873 (1894).
(1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 566.
10 (1925) 20 Ill. L. Rev. 271.
'150 AtI. 797 (Md. 1930).
Smith v. Lawson, 18 W. Va. 212, 41 Am. Rep. 688 (1881). See collection
of cases in note (1927) 50 A. L. R. 1340, 1348-1349.
"Woodland v. Fear, 7 El. & DI. 519, 119 Eng. Reprints 1339 (1857).
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TEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
credit given for a check on another branch has been allowed to be
charged back as if the branches were independent.' This case goes
a step further and says that the branch is separate for the purpose of acquiring the check In effect the drawee is held to be a
holder in due course since suit can only be brought in the name of
the parent bank
How are the courts to regard branch banks? Are they to be
strictly principal and agent or are the ordinary risks of loss in
such transactions through an agent to be limited by construing
the laws of agency and negotiable instruments to fit this class of
cases? It -must be admitted that such a holding seems to do
violence to the theory of bills of exchange. Ordinarily the bill is
extinguished when the drawee pays it. It is conceivable that the
drawee could be a holder in due course before the instrument is
presented for payment or is die but not after. How far separate
are they to be regarded? Whenever it is for their benefit? Or
shall the cpurts say that whenever a bank seeks the enlarged operations and profits possible it shall also assume all the risks incident
to such a procedure under the usual rules of agency and negotiable
instruments? Unfortunately the cases are few and the matter is
largely one for future settlement dependent for its ultimate decision on the social desirability of branch banking and protecting
such banks from the possibilities of loss in the peculiar nature of
their business.'
-- ROBmT E. STEALEY.
BILS AND NoTEs-ImuTn WARRANTY OF A TRANsFERon
PRoMIssoRY NoT.-The payee of a note,
secured by a vendor's lien on land, assigned it without recourse
for valuable consideration to another party, who, the court found,
looked to the lien as security. Later, the assignor made a release
of the lien, reciting that this note had been paid. Failing in suits
against the parties primarily liable, the assignee brought suit
against the assignor. The court held that a transferor without recourse for valuable consideration of a promissory note, whether
past due or not, impliedly warrants, among other things, that he
WITHOUT RECoURSE OF A

Chrzanowsld v. Corn Exch. Bank, 159 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1916).
Accord: London P. & S. Bank v. Buszard, 25 Times L. R. 142 (1918).
Contra: Petrie v. Garfield Savings Bank, 8 Ohio Opp. 266 (1917). See also
McNeil v. Wyatt, 3 Humph. 125 (Tenn. 1842); Bank of Old Dominion v.
McVeigh, 20 Grat. 785 (Va. 1875).
GBranch Banking is forbidden in West Virginia by W. VA. REv. CODE
(1930), c. 31, art. 4, § 9.
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